A 12 Step Guide to the EU’s Crisis of Political Responsibility
, ,w
In Italy, with a later start to the sovereign debt crisis, the centre-left first supported the emergency austerity package of the centre-right government. It then supported (together with the centre-right) a new government, which implemented the EU goals for labour market liberalization that were listed in a supposedly confidential letter, sent by both the incoming and outgoing presidents of the ECB.
While political outcomes varied to a certain extent in the first part of the crisis, the common outcome of EU intervention was in eliding policy differences between left and right, and therefore the democratic dynamics of government and opposition. Even if the crisis caused governmental defeats and early elections in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece, policy imposed from above remained unchanged. In fact, grand coalitions and (self-defined) technocratic governments were often appointed.
de facto
The ineffectiveness of the SGP was attributed to its weak capacity for enforcement, but during the crisis new and more stringent instruments were developed. First, in December 2011, the Six-Pack increased the strength and the scope of surveillance as well as potential sanctions for all member states, and even more stringently on the Eurozone. Passed in 2012, the Fiscal Compact is even more binding for Euro-countries, as it requires that member states report on their national debt to the Commission and the Council. Finally, the Two-Pack, coming into force in May 2013, has further specified budgetary policy aims, creating higher enforcement and surveillance mechanisms, with the requirement that sovereign member states send their budget proposals for prior approval to the EU and the Eurogroup. All these instruments put unprecedented constraints on social expenditure.
These developments have not only affected social movements in times of austerity, but also risk remaining permanent challenges in the future. While the structural adjustment programs were limited in time, the turn towards EU institutions that are more and more free market oriented and less and less democratic has been structured within institutional changes that are intended to last. If until about 15 years ago, the EU presented a mix of opportunities and threats for social movements, nowadays and for the foreseeable future the EU institutions have become unavoidable targets rather than potential allies. While at the beginning of the great recession, anti-austerity protests remained largely domestic, in the recent dramatic vicissitudes relating to the Greek crisis, and the EU role in it, what is becoming clear to progressive social movements in Europe seems to be the difficulty, but also the absolute necessity, of acting together beyond national borders.